This is a parallel topic to one moving forth at another site, but how say we address history with discussion of what have been Amtrak's greatest management blunders since A-Day.
My thought, and from one who has followed Amtrak affairs since 'the beginning' (and that beginning precedes both enactment of RPSA 70 and A-Day), I believe the greatest blunder occurred during 1972, when it became public knowledge that Amtrak was a 'fund or fold' operation. There were of course Congressional hearings, and then-President (CEO) Roger Lewis, was asked by a Member of Congress 'Sir, if we gave you a Billion (that's a 1972 billion) dollars, what kind of railroad could you give the American people?' The response from Mr. Lewis was, to the effect of, 'Congressman, that is more money than we could sensibly commit'.
Right there, especially considering '72 was an election year, Amtrak could have had a base for funding of a $B; instead, it has become a program that lives off whatever table scraps Congress chooses to throw its way. Had Mr. Lewis been more 'with the game' and simply tell them whatever fantasy they wanted to hear, Amtrak would have had a 'B' back then and Today its funding level would be somewhere between National Parks (about $4B) and NASA ($13B).
Posted by TBlack (Member # 181) on :
OMG!What a blockhead!Well, water over the dam(n), Mr. Norman.
Tom
Posted by palmland (Member # 4344) on :
Not securing a permanent means of funding is certainly Amtrak's biggest missed opportunity. I'm surprised Graham Claytor wasn't able to make progress on that.
Another missed opportunity was to secure an agreement with the railroads early in the game to retain the flexibility to make schedule and route changes as they had done in the days of excess rail capacity. In those days, most new timetables offered different route and schedules as Amtrak tried to be a bit creative and see what worked and what didn't.
Finally a long range equipment plan would have been a good idea to keep before congress and the public. Now it seems like each new Amtrak administration takes forever to develop their goal (if any) for equipment needs. At least we did get that second order of Superliner cars.
But missed equipment opportunities: restoring heritage cars for extra capacity (and revenue) and failing to order Viewliner coaches, diners, and lounges when the sleepers were ordered. And, how many years did we hear about Acela problems? Wouldn't it have been easier, faster, cheaper to get HSR off the shelf equipment from Europe of Japan. Yes, it probably would have required some modifications to meet FRA specs.
Posted by notelvis (Member # 3071) on :
Agree with Palmland re: Acela.
Swedish X2000 trainsets for the NEC (which Amtrak tested in 1993) would have delivered a more reliable HSR product sooner and at a better price. The manufacturer was prepared to set up shop in the US to meet any 'Buy American' requirements.
The other things - failure to establish a dedicated source of funding - failure to secure a more flexible operating agreement etc. are legitimate blunders but those are issues not entirely within Amtrak's control.
Presumably, the decision of where Amtrak's first high-speed trains would come from was.....at least mostly..... in Amtrak's court. Botching that was a big blunder.
Posted by smitty195 (Member # 5102) on :
Wasting millions and millions of dollars destroying perfectly good Dining Cars with "Cross Country Cafes". What a colossal waste....
Posted by yukon11 (Member # 2997) on :
I would have hoped that Amtrak would have considered, at least to some extent, Rep. John Mica's suggestions for allowing some competitive contracting, amongst the private sector, for some of Amtrak's long-distance routes.
Richard
Posted by Jerome Nicholson (Member # 3116) on :
Giving a pass on purchasing those Great Dome cars that were for sale and letting Auto Train get them.
Posted by George Harris (Member # 2077) on :
Rememeber, Graham Claytor was a businessman, not a politician.
Being far to oriented to the Northeast Corridor I regard as their worst mistake and one that contiune to bear rotten fruit. The headquarters should have been moved to some place outside the Northeast immediately. The viewpoint of the Amtrak management was clouded by sitting in a location buried way too deeply in the Pennsylvania Railroad legacy. Chicago or St. Louis would have been reasonable possibilities.