PARIS — In the wake of a fiery train crash this summer in northern Spain that killed 79 people, investigators, survivors and passengers are demanding to know why the rail line entrusted the train’s safety to a sole driver who had publicly boasted about past speeding and was talking on a mobile phone seconds before the derailment.
But even as the crash, near Santiago de Compostela on July 24, has focused attention on potential management lapses at the Spanish rail network, it was just one in a recent spate of deadly accidents involving passenger and freight trains in Belgium, France, Spain and Switzerland. Those accidents have raised troubling questions about a European rail network that has been the envy of much of the world
I would guess from the perspective of 620 Eighth Avenue, The Times can note that the last major fatal rail incident here has been Chatsworth during 2008. That of course has been attributed to Engineer negligence, and it appears Santiago de Compostela will be attributed to same. The railways could look at the financial burden that is being placed on the US roads, freight and passenger, as a result of Chatsworth - and that is the mandated Positive Train Control.
In view of that European freight and passenger traffic can only be described as 'flat' and likely is in decline from Europe's continued economic malaise as well as the incursion of the 'pay to potty' airlines, the System could be looking at expense it can ill afford to sustain at this time.
Posted by Geoff Mayo (Member # 153) on :
Thanks for posting the brief passage. At least I didn't have to suffer the full idiocy of the article. It is worrying to think that many people will read the article and think it is actually based on competent journalism.
The Times may well note the last major fatal rail incident here was Chatsworth but just because the recent Metro North crash didn't involve fatalities does not make it trivial. There is no doubt it would have been a lot worse if the second train was a few seconds earlier and wasn't able to drop its speed to a third before the side swipe. Any derailment is major because of the high risk of consequential collision.
quote:That of course has been attributed to Engineer negligence, and it appears Santiago de Compostela will be attributed to same.
Sorry but the latter part of that is even worse than the article you brought up. Firstly, the derailment point happened just after the end of fully supervised driving. I commented elsewhere that I was curious whether the system saw outside its area of supervision - in other words, did it enforce a reduction of speed before the supervision ended in anticipation of this curve? The braking distances and speeds involved suggest he should have been braking before that supervision ended. Yet the designers of said system could argue - with some degree of authority - that it was outside their area of control. Lo and behold, the Spanish train authorities have now added that enforced speed reduction, indicating that this incident could have been foreseen. This alone indicates that the driver is not going to be held solely accountable.
Secondly there is the question of the phone call. Now, US engineers aren't allowed mobile phones in the cab, so many Americans were quick to jump on the apparent lapses here. But that's not the full story. European train drivers don't have radios* like US engineers do, so they have to use mobiles for communication. Whether it was appropriate to discuss the railway business they were conducting at the time is something human factors people will have to decide upon.
* Well, it is radio sort of, but it's secure radio between selected parties, meaning the signaller (dispatcher) knows he is communicating with the correct train, and nobody not invited to the conversation can eavesdrop or think that an instruction is meant for him.
quote:The railways could look at the financial burden that is being placed on the US roads, freight and passenger, as a result of Chatsworth - and that is the mandated Positive Train Control.
I don't know if you're aware of this - it sounds like you're suggesting European railways look to PTC for a solution. There is a system being installed in Europe, Africa, Asia, Australasia, and South America called ERTMS. There are various levels of supervision and intervention, and manufacturers' products are interoperable. Thus you could take a Siemens data radio and plug it in to a Hitachi driving cab, with Bombardier radio base stations. ERTMS is not mandated every where (just major European trunk routes, in simple terms), basically because there are already safety systems in place - just not interoperable. The Eurostar running between London and Paris/Brussels, for example, requires four different safety systems installed in its cab to deal with each country's specifics. With ERTMS everywhere it would be just one.
Posted by Gilbert B Norman (Member # 1541) on :
Mr. Mayo, while I'm sure all European Union countries have rail accident investigative agencies (some likely more effective than others), and their final report is hardly released regarding Santiago, it still appears that the Driver (Engineer in Yankee) should have known where he was. News reports suggested he had been with RENFE for a while.
Here are links regarding a New Haven RR incident that occurred during 1955 about 25 miles from where I lived. This was a case of 'the Engineer and Fireman' did not know where they were account fog. (hope you can get to The New York Times article; sometimes my 'backdoor' works, sometimes not).
The only 'Positive Train Control' active here was lineside Automatic Block Signals; no cab signals, no radios, no automatic train stop system.
Regarding European HSR lines, I figured they had some kind of 'PTC' system considering the volume of traffic handled, but I was unaware that each rail system had their own and that they are now only being standardized.
Posted by Geoff Mayo (Member # 153) on :
quote:Originally posted by Gilbert B Norman: it still appears that the Driver (Engineer in Yankee) should have known where he was. News reports suggested he had been with RENFE for a while.
You fall in to the trap of apportioning blame without considering (or even knowing) the full facts behind the case. This surprises me because previously you have rightly warned against jumping to such conclusions before the investigators do their jobs.
You can be sure that driver situational awareness will be just one of many issues addressed in the final report.
Please, leave it be, and let the investigators do their job. Not you. Not me. And certainly not sensationalist dimwits manning the NYT.
Posted by Geoff Mayo (Member # 153) on :
quote:Originally posted by Gilbert B Norman: it still appears that the Driver (Engineer in Yankee) should have known where he was. News reports suggested he had been with RENFE for a while.
You fall in to the trap of apportioning blame without considering (or even knowing) the full facts behind the case. This surprises me because previously you have rightly warned against jumping to such conclusions before the investigators do their jobs.
You can be sure that driver situational awareness will be just one of many issues addressed in the final report.
You seem to misunderstand what the "positive" part of PTC means. ABS is not PTC because there is no enforcement.
Please, leave it be, and let the investigators do their job. Not you. Not me. And certainly not sensationalist dimwits manning the NYT.
Posted by Geoff Mayo (Member # 153) on :
quote:a sole driver who had publicly boasted about past speeding
While it may sound like I'm defending the driver (I'm not), this is another gutter press type of sensationalist comment. It's already been determined, at least a couple of months ago, that the "boast" was that he was at the speed limit, not over it. He was a high speed train driver, thus he drove at speed. That does not mean he was speeding.
Sadly the press just took comments out of context, made a story around it, it was debunked (simply by translating the Facebook page it appeared on), and yet two months later the NYT decides to run with it anyway.